巴菲特經典名言英文版

2024年2月22日發(作者：新年展望)

巴菲特經典名言英文版

“What counts for most people in investing is not how much they know, but

rather how realistically they define what they don't know. An investor needs to

do very few things right as long as he or she avoids big mistakes.”

就投資而言，人們應該注意的，不是他到底知道多少，而是應該注意自己到底有多少是不知道的，投資人不需要花太多時間去做對的事，只要他能夠盡量避免去犯重大的錯誤。

――1992 Letter to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders

“Obviously, every investor will make mistakes. But by confining himlf to a

relatively few，easy-to-understand cas, a reasonably intelligent, informed

and diligent person can judge investment risks with a uful degree of

accuracy.”

當然每個投資人都會犯錯，但只要將自己集中在相對少數，容易了解的投資個案上，一個理性、知性與耐性兼具的投資人一定能夠將投資風險限定在可接受的范圍之內。

――1993 Letter to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders

“When returns on capital are ordinary, an earn- more- by-putting-up-more

record is no great managerial achievement. You can get the same result

personally while operating from your rocking chair. just quadruple the capital

you commit to a savings account and you will quadruple your earnings. You

would hardly expect hosannas for that particular accomplishment. Yet,

retirement announcements regularly sing the prais of CEOs who have, say,

quadrupled earnings of their widget company during their reign - with no one

examining whether this gain was attributable simply to many years of retained

earnings and the workings of compound interest.”

當資本報酬率平平，這種大堆頭式的賺錢方式跟本沒什么了不起，你坐在搖椅上也能輕松達到這樣的成績，好比只要把你存在銀行戶頭里的錢，一樣可以賺到加倍的利息，沒有人會對這樣的成果報以掌聲，但通常我們在某位資深主管的退休儀式上歌頌他在任內將公司的盈余數字提高數倍，卻一點也不會去看看這些事實上是因為公司每年所累積盈余與復利所產生的效果。

――1985 Chairman's Letter to Shareholders

“We have tried occasionally to buy toads at bargain prices with results that

have been chronicled in past reports. Clearly our kiss fell flat. We have done

well with a couple of princes - but they were princes when purchad. At least

our kiss didn't turn them into toads. And, finally, we have occasionally been

quite successful in purchasing fractional interests in easily-identifiable princes

at toad-like prices.”

我們曾用劃算的價錢買下不少蟾蜍，過去的報告多已提及，很明顯的我們的吻表現平平，我們有遇到幾個王子級的公司，但是早在我們買下時他們就已是王子了，而至少我們的吻沒讓他們變回蟾蜍，而最后我們偶爾也曾成功地以蟾蜍般的價格買到部份王子級公司的部份股權。

――1981 Chairman's Letters to Shareholders

“First, many in Wall Street - a community in which quality control is not prized -

will ll investors anything they will buy.”

第一課，不論是什么東西，只要有人要買，華爾街那幫人都會想辦法弄來賣給你。

――2000 Letter to Shareholders

“The most common cau of low prices is pessimism-some times pervasive,

some times specific to a company or industry. We want to do business in such

an environment, not becau we like pessimism but becau we like the prices

it produces. It's optimism that is the enemy of the rational buyer.”

股價不振最主要的原因是悲觀的情緒，有時是全面性的，有時則僅限于部份產業或是公司，我們很期望能夠在這種環境下做生意，不是因為我們天生喜歡悲觀，而是如此可以得到便宜的價格買進更多好的公司，樂觀是理性投資人最大的敵人。

――1990 Chairman's Letter to Shareholders

“Ben’s Mr. Market allegory may em out-of-date in today's investment world,

in which most professionals and academicians talk of efficient markets,

dynamic hedging and betas. Their interest in such matters is understandable,

since techniques shrouded in mystery clearly have value to the purveyor of

investment advice. After all, what witch doctor has ever achieved fame and

fortune by simply advising 'Take two aspirins'?”

葛拉漢的市場先生理論在現今的投資世界內或許顯得有些過時，尤其是在那些大談市場效率理論、動態避險與beta值的專家學者眼中更是如此，他們會對那些深奧的課題感到興趣是可以理解的，因為這對于渴望投資建議的追求者來說，是相當具吸引力的，就像是沒有一位名醫可以單靠「吃兩顆阿斯匹寧」這類簡單有效的建議成名致富的。

――1987 Chairman's Letter to Shareholders

“John Maynard Keynes, who brilliance as a practicing investor matched his

brilliance in thought, wrote a letter to a business associate, F. C. Scott, on

August 15, 1934 that says it all: As time goes on，I get more and more

convinced that the right method in investment is to put fairly large sums into

enterpris which one thinks one knows something about and in the

management of which one thoroughly believes. It is a mistake to think that one

limits one's risk by spreading too much between enterpris about which one

knows little and has no reason for special confidence… One's knowledge and

experience are definitely limited and there are ldom more than two or

three enterpris at any given time in which I personally feel mylf entitled to

put full confidence.”

著名經濟學家凱因斯，他的投資績效跟他的理論思想一樣杰出，在1934年8月15日他曾經寫了一封信給生意伙伴Scott上面寫到，隨著時光的流逝，我越來越相信正確的投資方式是將大部分的資金投入在自己認為了解且相信的事業之上，而不是將資金分散到自己不懂且沒有特別信心的一大堆公司，每個人的知識與經驗一定有其限度，就我本身而言，我很難同時有兩三家以上的公司可以讓我感到完全的放心。

――1991 Letter to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders

“I would rather be certain of a good result than hopeful of a great one.”

但與其兩鳥在林，還不如一鳥在手。

――1996 Letter to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders

“The line parating investment and speculation, which is never bright and

clear, becomes blurred still further when most market participants have

recently enjoyed triumphs. Nothing dates rationality like large dos of

effortless money. After a heady experience of that kind, normally nsible

people drift into behavior akin to that of Cinderella at the ball. They know that

overstaying the festivities - that is, continuing to speculate in companies that

have gigantic valuations relative to the cash they are likely to generate in the

future - will eventually bring on pumpkins and mice. But they nevertheless hate

to miss a single minute of what is one helluva party. Therefore, the giddy

participants all plan to leave just conds before midnight. There's a problem,

though: They are dancing in a room in which the clocks have no hands.”

投資與投機之間永遠是一線之隔，尤其是當所有市場的參與者都沉浸在歡愉的氣氛當中時更是如此，再也沒有比大筆不勞而獲的金錢更讓人失去理性，在經歷過這類經驗之后，再正常的人也會像參加舞會的灰姑娘一樣被沖昏了頭，他們明知在舞會中多待一會-也就是繼續將大筆的資金投入到投機的活動之上，南瓜馬車與老鼠駕駛現出原形的機率就越高，但他們還是舍不得錯過這場盛大舞會的任何一分鐘，所有人都打算繼續待到最后一刻才離開，但問題是這場舞會中的時鐘根本就沒有指針!

“Much success can be attributed to inactivity. Most investors cannot resist the

temptation to constantly buy and ll.”

“When a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a

poor reputation for fundamental economics, it is the reputation of the business

that stays intact.”

“I will tell you how to become rich. Clo the doors. Be fearful when others

are greedy. Be greedy when others are fearful.”

――Warren Buffett lecturing to a group of students at Columbia U

“There are all kinds of business that Charlie and I don't understand, but that

doesn't cau us to stay up at night. It just means we go on to the next one,

and that's what the individual investor should do.”

――Warren Buffett in a Morningstar Interview

“If you're an investor, you're looking on what the ast is going to do, if

you're a speculator, you're commonly focusing on what the price of the object

is going to do, and that's not our game.”

――1997 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

“It is our job to help our clients be fearful when others are greedy, and look at

opportunities when others are fearful.”

“If you understood a business perfectly and the future of the business, you

would need very little in the way of a margin of safety. So, the more vulnerable

the business is, assuming you still want to invest in it, the larger margin of

safety you'd need. If you're driving a truck across a bridge that says it holds

10,000 pounds and you've got a 9,800 pound vehicle, if the bridge is 6 inches

above the crevice it covers, you may feel okay, but if it's over the Grand

Canyon, you may feel you want a little larger margin ”

――1997 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

“You pay a high price for a cheery connsus.” “If you understood a business

perfectly and the future of the business, you would need very little in the way of

a margin of safety. So, the more vulnerable the business is, assuming you still

want to invest in it, the larger margin of safety you'd need. If you're driving a

truck across a bridge that says it holds 10,000 pounds and you've got a 9,800

pound vehicle, if the bridge is 6 inches above the crevice it covers, you may

feel okay, but if it's over the Grand Canyon, you may feel you want a little

larger margin ”

――1997 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

“The only way to be loved is to be loveable, which really irritates me.”

―― Warren Buffett speaking at the City Club in Seattle (July 21, 2001)

“When they open that envelope, the first instruction is to take my pul again.”

――2001 Annual Meeting after mentioning that the instructions of his

succession are aled in an envelope at headquarters

“Charlie and I decided long ago that in an investment lifetime it's too hard to

make hundreds of smart decisions. That judgment became ever more

compelling as Berkshire's capital mushroomed and the univer of

investments that could significantly affect our results shrank dramatically.

Therefore, we adopted a strategy that required our being smart - and not too

smart at that - only a very few times. Indeed, we'll now ttle for one good idea

a year.”

“The fact that people will be full of greed, fear or folly is predictable. The

quence is not predictable.”

――Warren Buffett, Financial Review, 1985

“I am out of step with prent conditions. When the game is no longer played

your way, it is only human to say the new approach is all wrong, bound to lead

to trouble, and so on. On one point, however, I am clear. I will not abandon a

previous approach who logic I understand ( although I find it difficult to apply )

even though it may mean foregoing large, and apparently easy, profits to

embrace an approach which I don't fully understand, have not practiced

successfully, and which possibly could lead to substantial permanent loss of

capital.”

――Warren Buffett in a letter to his partners in the stock market frenzy of

1969.

“We've long felt that the only value of stock forecasters is to make fortune

tellers look good. Even now, Charlie and I continue to believe that short-term

market forecasts are poison and should be kept locked up in a safe place,

away from children and also from grown-ups who behave in the market like

children.”

“The key to investing is not asssing how much an industry is going to affect

society, or how much it will grow, but rather determining the competitive

advantage of any given company and, above all, the durability of that

advantage.”

――July 1999 at Herb Allen's Sun Valley, Idaho Retreat

“The most common cau of low prices is pessimism-some times pervasive,

some times specific to a company or industry. We want to do business in such

an environment, not becau we like pessimism but becau we like the prices

it produces. It's optimism that is the enemy of the rational buyer.”

I don't read economic forecasts. I don't read the funny papers.

The stock market is a no-called-strike game. You don't have to swing at

everything--you can wait for your pitch. The problem when you're a money

manager is that your fans keep yelling， 'Swing, you bum!'

――1999 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

Success in investing doesn't correlate with I.Q. once you're above the level

of 25. Once you have ordinary intelligence, what you need is the temperament

to control the urges that get other people into trouble in investing.

――BusinessWeek Interview June 25 1999

Our future rates of gain will fall far short of tho achieved in the past.

Berkshire's capital ba is now simply too large to allow us to earn truly

outsized returns. If you believe otherwi, you should consider a career in

sales but avoid one in mathematics (bearing in mind that there are really only

three kinds of people in the world: tho who can count and tho who can't).

我們未來的成長率將遠不及過去所創造的水準，Berkshire現在的規模實在是大到我們很難再做出任何重大的突破，若是你不這樣認為，你應該去從事業務員的工作，而不是去教數學(請永遠記住，世界上只有三種人，一種會算術，另一種不會算術)。

――1998 Chairman's Letter to Shareholders

There are all kinds of business that Charlie and I don't understand, but

that doesn't cau us to stay up at night. It just means we go on to the next one,

and that's what the individual investor should do.

――Warren Buffett in a Morningstar Interview

“Investors making purchas in an overheated market need to recognize

that it may often take an extended period for the value of even an outstanding

company to catch up with the price they paid.”

――Berkshire Hathaway 1998 Annual Meeting

“We don't get paid for activity, just for being right. As to how long we'll wait,

we'll wait indefinitely.”

――Berkshire Hathaway 1998 Annual Meeting

Time is the enemy of the poor business and the friend of the great business.

If you have a business that's earning 20%-25% on equity, time is your friend.

But time is your enemy if your money is in a low return business.

――1998 Berkshire Annual Meeting

If you expect to be a net saver during the next 5 years, should you hope for a

higher or lower stock market during that period? Many investors get this one

wrong. Even though they are going to be net buyers of stocks for many years

to come, they are elated when stock prices ri and depresd when they

reaction makes no n. Only tho who will be llers of equities in

the near future should be happy at eing stocks ri. Prospective purchars

should much prefer sinking prices.

假設你預估未來五年內可以存一筆錢，那么你希望這期間的股票市場是漲還是跌?

這時許多投資人對于這個問題的答案就可能是錯的，雖然他們在未來的期間內會陸續買進股票，不過當股價漲時他們會感到高興，股價跌時反而覺得沮喪，這種

感覺不等于是當你去買漢堡吃時，看到漢堡漲價卻欣喜若狂，這樣的反應實在是沒有什么道理，只有在短期間準備賣股票的人才應該感到高興，準備買股票的人應該期待的是股價的下滑。

――1997 Chairman's Letter to Shareholders

“The strategy (of portfolio concentration ) we've adopted precludes our

following standard diversification dogma. Many pundits would therefore say

the strategy must be riskier than that employed by more conventional investors.

We disagree. We believe that a policy of portfolio concentration may well

decrea risk if it rais, as it should, both the intensity with which an investor

thinks about a business and the comfort-level he must feel with its economic

characteristics before buying into it.”

我們采取的這種策略排除了依照普通分散風險的教條，許多學者便會言之鑿鑿說我們這種策略比起一般傳統的投資風險要高的許多，這點我們不敢茍同，我們相信集中持股的做法同樣可以大幅降低風險，只要投資人在買進股份之前，能夠加強本身對于企業的認知以及對于競爭能力熟悉的程度，在這里我們將風險定義，與一般字典里的一樣，系指損失或受傷的可能性。

――1993 Chairman's Letter to Shareholders

“In 1971, pension fund managers invested a record 122% of net funds

available in equities - at full prices they couldn't buy enough of them. In 1974,

after the bottom had fallen out, they committed a then record low of 21% to

stocks.”

“We believe that a policy of portfolio concentration may well decrea risk if

it rais, as it should, both the intensity with which an investor thinks about a

business and the comfort-level he must feel with its economic characteristics

before buying into it. In stating this opinion, we define risk, using dictionary

terms, as 'the possibility of loss or injury.'”

我們相信集中持股的做法同樣可以大幅降低風險，只要投資人在買進股份之前，能夠加強本身對于企業的認知以及對于競爭能力熟悉的程度，在這里我們將風險定義，與一般字典里的一樣，系指損失或受傷的可能性。

――1993 Letter to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders

“We think diversification, as practiced generally, makes very little n for

anyone who knows what they're doing. Diversification rves as protection

against ignorance. If you want to make sure that nothing bad happens to you

relative to the market, you should own everything. There's nothing wrong with

that. It's a perfectly sound approach for somebody who doesn't know how to

analyze business.

“But if you know how to value business,it's crazy to own 50 stocks or 40

stocks or 30 stocks, probably becau there aren't that many wonderful

business understandable to a single human being in all likelihood. To forego

buying more of some super-wonderful business and instead put your money

into 30 or 35 on your list of attractiveness just strikes Charlie and me as

madness.”

――1996 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

“The most important thing in terms of your circle of competence is not how

large the area of it is, but how well you've defined the perimeter. If you know

where the edges are, you're way better off than somebody that's got one that's

five times as large but they get very fu about the edges.”

――“Warren Buffett Talks Business,” The University of North Carolina, Center

for Public Television, Chapel Hill, 1995

“Price is what you pay. Value is what you get.” “Your goal as an investor

should simply be to purcha, at a rational price, a part interest in an

easily-understandable business who earnings are virtually certain to be

materially higher five, ten and twenty years from now. Over time, you will find

only a few companies that meet the standards - so when you e one that

qualifies, you should buy a meaningful amount of stock. You must also resist

the temptation to stray from your guidelines: If you aren't willing to own a stock

for ten years, don't even think about owning it for ten minutes. Put together a

portfolio of companies who aggregate earnings march upward over the

years, and so also will the portfolio's market value.”

――1996 Shareholders Letter

“Our policy is to concentrate holdings. We try to avoid buying a little of this or

that when we are only lukewarm about the business or its price. When we are

convinced as to attractiveness, we believe in buying worthwhile amounts.”

我們的政策是集中持股(Concentrate Holdings)。當我們決定了后便買進「一大筆」，而非這也買一點、那也買點，但事后卻漠不關心。

――1978 Letter to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders

“I put a heavy weight on certainty. If you do that, the whole idea of a risk factor

doesn't make n to me. Risk comes from not knowing what you're doing.”

――“Buffett Talks Strategy with Students”, Omaha World-Herald 1994