康德:什么是啟蒙運動[英文版]

2024年3月25日發(作者：be動詞過去式)

康德：什么是啟蒙運動［英文版］

What Is Enlightenment?

By Immanuel Kant

The 18th-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant

published his influential work

The Critique of Pure Reason

in

1781. Three years later, he expanded on his study of the modes

of thinking with an essay entitled

"What is Enlightenment?"

In

this 1784 essay, Kant challenged readers to "dare to know,"

arguing that it was not only a civic but also a moral duty to

exerci the fundamental freedoms of thought and expression.

Enlightenment is man’s leaving his lf-caud

immaturity. Immaturity is the incapacity to u one's

intelligence without the guidance of another. Such immaturity

is lf-caud if it is not caud by lack of intelligence, but by

lack of determination and courage to u one's intelligence

without being guided by another. Sapere Aude! [Dare to

know!] Have the courage to u your own intelligence! is

therefore the motto of the enlightenment.

Through laziness and cowardice a large part of mankind,

even after nature has freed them from alien guidance, gladly

remain immature. It is becau of laziness and cowardice that

it is so easy for others to usurp the role of guardians. It is so

comfortable to be a minor! If I have a book which provides

meaning for me, a pastor who has conscience for me, a doctor

who will judge my diet for me and so on, then I do not need

to exert mylf. I do not have any need to think; if I can pay,

others will take over the tedious job for me. The guardians

who have kindly undertaken the supervision will e to it that

by far the largest part of mankind, including the entire

"beautiful x," should consider the step into maturity, not

only as difficult but as very dangerous.

After having made their domestic animals dumb and

having carefully prevented the quiet creatures from daring

to take any step beyond the lead-strings to which they have

fastened them, the guardians then show them the danger

which threatens them, should they attempt to walk alone.

Now this danger is not really so very great; for they would

presumably learn to walk after some stumbling. However, an

example of this kind intimidates and frightens people out of

all further attempts.

It is difficult for the isolated individual to work himlf

out of the immaturity which has become almost natural for

him. He has even become fond of it and for the time being is

incapable of employing his own intelligence, becau he has

never been allowed to make the attempt. Statutes and

formulas, the mechanical tools of a rviceable u, or

rather misu, of his natural faculties, are the ankle-chains of

a continuous immaturity. Whoever threw it off would make

an uncertain jump over the smallest trench becau he is not

accustomed to such free movement. Therefore there are only

a few who have pursued a firm path and have succeeded in

escaping from immaturity by their own cultivation of the

mind.

But it is more nearly possible for a public to enlighten

itlf: this is even inescapable if only the public is given its

freedom. For there will always be some people who think for

themlves, even among the lf-appointed guardians of the

great mass who, after having thrown off the yoke of

immaturity themlves, will spread about them the spirit of a

reasonable estimate of their own value and of the need for

every man to think for himlf. It is strange that the very

public, which had previously been put under this yoke by the

guardians, forces the guardians thereafter to keep it there if

it is stirred up by a few of its guardians who are themlves

incapable of all enlightenment. It is thus very harmful to plant

prejudices, becau they come back to plague tho very

people who themlves (or who predecessors) have been

the originators of the prejudices. Therefore a public can

only arrive at enlightenment slowly. Through revolution, the

abandonment of personal despotism may be engendered and

the end of profit-eking and domineering oppression may

occur, but never a true reform of the state of mind. Instead,

new prejudices, just like the old ones, will rve as the guiding

reins of the great, unthinking mass.

All that is required for this enlightenment is freedom; and

particularly the least harmful of all that may be called

freedom, namely, the freedom for man to make public u of

his reason in all matters. But I hear people clamor on all sides:

Don't argue! The officer says: Don't argue, drill! The tax

collector: Don't argue, pay! The pastor: Don't argue, believe!

(Only a single lord in the world says: Argue, as much as you

want to and about what you plea, but obey!) Here we have

restrictions on freedom everywhere. Which restriction is

hampering enlightenment, and which does not, or even

promotes it? I answer: The public u of a man's reason must

be free at all times, and this alone can bring enlightenment

among men: while the private u of a man's reason may

often be restricted rather narrowly without thereby unduly

hampering the progress of enlightenment.

I mean by the public u of one's reason, the u which a

scholar makes of it before the entire reading public. Private

u I call the u which he may make of this reason in a civic

post or office. For some affairs which are in the interest of the

commonwealth a certain mechanism is necessary through

which some members of the commonwealth must remain

purely passive in order that an artificial agreement with the

government for the public good be maintained or so that at

least the destruction of the good be prevented. In such a

situation it is not permitted to argue; one must obey. But in

so far as this unit of the machine considers himlf as a

member of the entire commonwealth, in fact even of world

society; in other words, he considers himlf in the quality of

a scholar who is addressing the true public through his

writing, he may indeed argue without the affairs suffering for

which he is employed partly as a passive member. Thus it

would be very harmful if an officer who, given an order by his

superior, should start, while in the rvice, to argue

concerning the utility or appropriateness of that command.

He must obey, but he cannot equitably be prevented from

making obrvations as a scholar concerning the mistakes in

the military rvice nor from submitting the to the public

for its judgment. The citizen cannot refu to pay the taxes

impod upon him. Indeed, a rash criticism of such taxes, if

they are the ones to be paid by him, may be punished as a

scandal which might cau general resistance. But the same

man does not act contrary to the duty of a citizen if, as a

scholar, he utters publicly his thoughts against the

undesirability or even the injustice of such taxes. Likewi a

clergyman is obliged to teach his pupils and his congregation

according to the doctrine of the church which he rves, for

he has been accepted on that condition. But as a scholar, he

has full freedom, in fact, even the obligation, to communicate

to the public all his diligently examined and well-intentioned

thoughts concerning erroneous points in that doctrine and

concerning proposals regarding the better institution of

religious and ecclesiastical matters. There is nothing in this

for which the conscience could be blamed. For what he

teaches according to his office as one authorized by the

church, he prents as something in regard to which he has

no latitude to teach according to his own preference.… He will

say: Our church teaches this or that, the are the proofs

which are employed for it. In this way he derives all possible

practical benefit for his congregation from rules which he

would not himlf subscribe to with full conviction. But he

may nevertheless undertake the prentation of the rules

becau it is not entirely inconceivable that truth may be

contained in them. In any ca, there is nothing directly

contrary to inner religion to be found in such doctrines. For,

should he believe that the latter was not the ca he could not

administer his office in good conscience; he would have to

resign it. Therefore the u which an employed teacher makes

of his reason before his congregation is merely a private u

since such a gathering is always only domestic, no matter how

large. As a priest (a member of an organization) he is not free

and ought not to be, since he is executing someone el's

mandate. On the other hand, the scholar speaking through his

writings to the true public which is the world, like the

clergyman making public u of his reason, enjoys an

unlimited freedom to employ his own reason and to speak in

his own person. For to suggest that the guardians of the

people in spiritual matters should always be immature minors

is a nonn which would mean perpetuating forever

existing nonn.

But should a society of clergymen, for instance an

ecclesiastical asmbly, be entitled to commit itlf by oath to

a certain unalterable doctrine in order to perpetuate an

endless guardianship over each of its members and through

them over the people? I answer that this is quite inconceivable.

Such a contract which would be concluded in order to keep

humanity forever from all further enlightenment is absolutely

impossible, even should it be confirmed by the highest

authority through parliaments and the most solemn peace

treaties. An age cannot conclude a pact and take an oath upon

it to commit the succeeding age to a situation in which it

would be impossible for the latter to enlarge even its most

important knowledge, to eliminate error and altogether to

progress in enlightenment. Such a thing would be a crime

against human nature, the original destiny of which consists

in such progress. Succeeding generations are entirely justified

in discarding such decisions as unauthorized and criminal.

The touchstone of all this to be agreed upon as a law for

people is to be found in the question whether a people could

impo such a law upon itlf. Now it might be possible to

introduce a certain order for a definite short period as if in

anticipation of a better order. This would be true if one

permitted at the same time each citizen and especially the

clergyman to make his criticisms in his quality as a scholar.…

In the meantime, the provisional order might continue until

the insight into the particular matter in hand has publicly

progresd to the point where through a combination of

voices (although not, perhaps, of all) a proposal may be

brought to the crown. Thus tho congregations would be

protected which had agreed to (a changed religious

institution) according to their own ideas and better

understanding, without hindering tho who desired to allow

the old institutions to continue.…

A man may postpone for himlf, but only for a short time,

enlightening himlf regarding what he ought to know. But

to resign from such enlightenment altogether either for his

own person or even more for his descendants means to

violate and to trample underfoot the sacred rights of mankind.

Whatever a people may not decide for themlves, a monarch

may even less decide for the people, for his legislative

reputation rests upon his uniting the entire people's will in his

own. If the monarch will only e to it that every true or

imagined reform (of religion) fits in with the civil order, he

had best let his subjects do what they consider necessary for

the sake of their salvation; that is not his affair. His only

concern is to prevent one subject from hindering another by

force, to work according to each subject's best ability to

determine and to promote his salvation. In fact, it detracts

from his majesty if he interferes in such matters and subjects

to governmental supervision the writings by which his

subjects ek to clarify their ideas (concerning religion). This

is true whether he does it from his own highest insight, for in

this ca he expos himlf to the reproach: Caesar non est

supra grammaticos [Caesar is not above the laws of grammar];

it is even more true when he debas his highest power to

support the spiritual despotism of some tyrants in his state

against the rest of his subjects.

The question may now be put: Do we live at prent in an

enlightened age? The answer is: No, but in an age of

enlightenment. Much still prevents men from being placed in

a position or even being placed into position to u their own

minds curely and well in matters of religion. But we do have

very definite indications that this field of endeavor is being

opened up for men to work freely and reduce gradually the

hindrances preventing a general enlightenment and an

escape from lf-caud immaturity. In this n, this age is

the age of enlightenment and the age of(the Great)[Frederick

II of].

A prince should not consider it beneath him to declare

that he believes it to be his duty not to prescribe anything to

his subjects in matters of religion but to leave to them

complete freedom in such things. In other words, a prince

who refus the conceited title of being "tolerant," is himlf

enlightened. He derves to be praid by his grateful

contemporaries and descendants as the man who first freed

humankind of immaturity, at least as far as the government is

concerned and who permitted everyone to u his own reason

in all matters of conscience. Under his rule, venerable

clergymen could, regardless of their official duty, t forth

their opinions and views even though they differ from the

accepted doctrine here and there; they could do so in the

quality of scholars, freely and publicly. The same holds even

more true of every other person who is not thus restricted by

official duty. This spirit of freedom is spreading even outside

(the country ofthe Great) to places where it has to struggle

with the external hindrances impod by a government which

misunderstands its own position. For an example is

illuminating them which shows that such freedom (public

discussion) need not cau the slightest worry regarding

public curity and the unity of the commonwealth. Men rai

themlves by and by out of backwardness if one does not

purpoly invent artifices to keep them down.

I have emphasized the main point of enlightenment, that

is of man's relea from his lf-caud immaturity, primarily

in matters of religion. I have done this becau our rulers have

no interest in playing the guardian of their subjects in matters

of arts and sciences. Furthermore immaturity in matters of

religion is not only most noxious but also most dishonorable.

But the point of view of a head of state who favors freedom

in the arts and sciences goes even farther; for he understands

that there is no danger in legislation permitting his subjects

to make public u of their own reason and to submit publicly

their thoughts regarding a better framing of such laws

together with a frank criticism of existing legislation. We have

a shining example of this; no prince excels him whom we

admire. Only he who is himlf enlightened does not fear

spectres when he at the same time has a well-disciplined army

at his disposal as a guarantee of public peace. Only he can say

what (the ruler of a)dare not say: Argue as much as you want

and about whatever you want but obey! Thus we e here as

elwhere an unexpected turn in human affairs just as we

obrve that almost everything therein is paradoxical. A great

degree of civic freedom ems to be advantageous for the

freedom of the spirit of the people and yet it establishes

impassable limits. A lesr degree of such civic freedom

provides additional space in which the spirit of a people can

develop to its full capacity. Therefore nature has cherished,

within its hard shell, the germ of the inclination and need for

free thought. This free thought gradually acts upon the mind

of the people and they gradually become more capable of

acting in freedom. Eventually, the government is also

influenced by this free thought and thereby it treats man, who

is now more than a machine, according to his dignity.